Sentience in living tissue by Pereira, Alfredo, Jr.
Pereira, Alfredo, Jr. (2017) Sentience in living tissue. Animal Sentience 13(5) 
DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1235 
This article has appeared in the journal Animal Sentience, 
a peer-reviewed journal on animal cognition and feeling. It 
has been made open access, free for all, by WellBeing 
International and deposited in the WBI Studies 
Repository. For more information, please contact 
wbisr-info@wellbeingintl.org. 
Animal Sentience 2017.037:  Pereira on Woodruff on Fish Feel 
 1 
Sentience in living tissue 
Commentary on Woodruff on Fish Feel 
 
 
Alfredo Pereira, Jr. 
Institute of Biosciences 
São Paulo State University (UNESP) 
 
Abstract:  I agree with Woodruff’s concept of sentience but must disagree about what he 
proposes as the biological correlates of feeling. Based on the interpretation of brain function 
originally presented by Camilo Golgi, I assume that feelings are instantiated by hydro-ionic 
waves in living tissue. From this viewpoint, the anatomical, physiological and behavioural 
criteria of Woodruff would not be necessary to argue for sentience in fish. 
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Michael Woodruff (2017) argues for the existence of conscious activity in ray-finned fishes of 
the teleost subclass. His argument is based on the neural organization of their nervous 
system; a neural circuit involving the optical tectum and the pallium would be sufficient to 
support that “fish feel.”  
 The concept of sentience as “the minimal capacity to have subjective experience of 
the qualities associated with external and internal sensations, as well as affective and 
motivational states for phenomenal consciousness,” and the reference to Allen and 
Trestman (2016), are very close to the concept of consciousness and feeling I have proposed 
(Pereira, Jr., 2013). This conceptual convergence is rare in consciousness studies. However, 
we do not seem to agree on the biological correlates of sentience.  
 The "Neuron Doctrine," implicit in the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (Low 
et al., 2012) and possibly also in Woodruff’s expert reasoning (for instance, when he refers 
to neuron firing rates as indicating mental activity), implies that sentience requires a specific 
kind of neuronal architecture that can represent external and internal patterns accurately, to 
guide selective attention and to drive adaptive behavior. Instead of that assumption, I 
propose that sentience — at least for affective and motivational states, which are the focus 
of the paper — is based on hydro-ionic waves (see Pereira, Jr., 2017) in living tissue, 
generating graded electric potentials that can be found in practically all animal species, and 
also in plants.  
 The question of “tissue versus neuronal activity” as the biological substrate of mental 
functions began in 1906, when the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine was awarded 
jointly to Camillo Golgi and Santiago Ramón y Cajal for their work on the structure of the 
nervous system. The first Nobelists received equal recognition by the scientific community, 
but their theoretical approaches to mental function were different. Golgi emphasized the 
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structure of neural tissue (including neurons, glia and extracellular components) as carriers 
of mental functions, while Ramon y Cajal elaborated on the "Neuron Doctrine," assuming 
that the neuron was the structural and functional unit of the brain/mind. Cajal’s doctrine has 
dominated neuroscientific thought for more than a century. 
 The emphasis on neurons became critical after McCulloch and Pitts’s (1943) logical 
calculus based on action potentials, inspiring the creation of machines endowed with 
artificial intelligence. The success of these machines in several tasks, such as chess-playing, 
gave rise to the myth that the improvement of their intelligence, based on mechanical 
processing using a binary code, could result in artificial consciousness. The corresponding 
myth in the cognitive neurosciences has been that conscious activity is based on patterns of 
neuronal firing and synaptic connectivity in complex circuits and/or special regions of the 
brain. 
 Taking into consideration the existence of alternative ways of conceiving the 
biological correlates of mental function, is the detailed discussion of fish anatomy and 
physiology developed by Woodruff really needed for the argument in favor of fish sentience? 
In the model of sentience I have proposed, following Golgi’s approach, the answer is 
negative. The biological correlate of elementary sentience is proposed to be a phenomenon 
that occurs in practically all kinds of living tissue, from the plant syncytium to the human 
astroglial network (a review of astroglial function in the human brain can be found in Pereira, 
Jr., and Furlan, 2010).  
 In a previous commentary in this journal, Woodruff (2016) argued against a cellular 
basis of sentience (Reber, 2016, 2017). His argument was that sentience has no explanatory 
power regarding the behavior of unicellular living systems. In the fish species here discussed, 
he claims that “one requirement is that the visual world be accurately represented in the 
tectum” and that sentience is also necessary for selective attention: “if sentience did not 
exist, then the processes of selective attention would have no work to do” (Woodruff, 2017). 
This is an excellent argument, but misses one aspect of the problem: the “animal feel,” 
considered as an affective state, is a phenomenal experience that does not depend on 
accurate representations, selective attention or adaptive control of behavior. For example, 
we have introspective evidence that — contrary to the assumption of LeDoux (2012) — 
feeling pain does not require a previous representation of pain. This introspective evidence is 
not contradicted by another piece of introspective evidence: we can attempt to represent 
pain a posteriori (for instance, interpreting it as “tooth pain”). In this case, the lived 
experience of pain is (fortunately) only partially captured by the representation. 
 From the above considerations, I conclude that sentience does not depend on mental 
representations, selective attention or adaptive control of behaviour: sentience comes first 
(both phylogeneticallly and phenomenologically) and motivates them. We interpret 
incoming signals and represent them according to our feels; we direct our attention 
according to motivations defined by our current affective states, and we act in the 
environment to maximize our good feels. Therefore, it is conceivable that all multicellular 
living systems able to generate a hydro-ionic wave (measurable as a graded electric 
potential) can experience the feels proper to their species, even if they do not have cognitive 
capacities to produce accurate representations, to exert selective attention or to elaborate 
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On November 17-18, 2017, the NYU Center for Mind, Brain and 
Consciousness, the NYU Center for Bioethics, and NYU Animal Studies will 
host a conference on Animal Consciousness. 
 
This conference will bring together philosophers and scientists to discuss 
questions such as: Are invertebrates conscious? Do fish feel pain? Are non-
human mammals self-conscious? How did consciousness evolve? How does 
research on animal consciousness affect the ethical treatment of animals? What 
is the impact of issues about animal consciousness on theories of consciousness 




Speakers and panelists include: 
  
Colin Allen (University of Pittsburgh, Department of History & Philosophy of 
Science), Andrew Barron (Macquarie, Cognitive Neuroethology),  
Victoria Braithwaite (Penn State, Biology), Peter Carruthers (Maryland, 
Philosophy), Marian Dawkins (Oxford, Zoology), Dan Dennett (Tufts, 
Philosophy), David Edelman (San Diego, Neuroscience),  
Todd Feinberg (Mt. Sinai, Neurology), Peter Godfey-Smith (Sydney, 
Philosophy), Lori Gruen (Wesleyan, Philosophy), Brian Hare (Duke, Evolutionary 
Anthropology), Stevan Harnad (Montreal, Cognitive Science), Eva Jablonka (Tel 
Aviv, Cohn Institute), Björn Merker (Neuroscience), Diana Reiss (Hunter, 
Psychology), Peter Singer (Princeton, Philosophy), Michael Tye (Texas, Philosophy) 
 
 
Organizers: Ned Block, David Chalmers, Dale Jamieson, S. Matthew Liao. 
 
The conference will run from 9am on Friday November 17 to 6pm on Saturday November 18 at the NYU Cantor Film Center (36 E 
8th St).  
 
Friday sessions will include “Invertebrates and the evolution of consciousness”, “Do fish feel pain?”, and “Animal consciousness 
and ethics”.  
 
Saturday sessions will include “Animal self-consciousness”, “Animal consciousness and theories of consciousness”, and a panel 
discussion.  
 
A detailed schedule will be circulated closer to the conference date. 
 
Registration is free but required.  
 
Register here.  
 
See also the conference website. 
 
 
 
 
 
